Constitutions: Pure Reflections & Deep Rationality


Man that has no desire to do something for his ideas, shows one or another: either his ideas have not any value or himself has not values.
Plato

Abstract

Plato and Aristotle: from modern constitutionalists to ancient thinker and the opposite -- makes this text to be fundamental and preponderant over the thinkers of civil society. Also, discusses the core of the today’s society and simplify the disquisitions of the present constitutions.

Key words: constitutionalism, natural laws, human laws, ethics, eunomia and phronesis.

By Ylli Përmeti


Introduction

In the previous reflection I emphasized my deliberation on the mind and morality of the politicians par excellence. I took as example a superpower in the international scacchiera and a superpower in the regional periphery. America as we know, is a superpower, and Israel, is as well a superpower in its region. They give to each other power with the only aim to conquer the world. Some times by fighting and some times by helping. They ‘help’ other countries to democratise their established culture. America for instance, with the reliance of Britain has a very successful way to achieve its goal: destroy and democratise and some times vice versa. This is simple to understand: first we show off our paradigm of the established democracy, second, we prepare our media to transmit this achievement to the demoi, third, we create some scholars from our knowledge and we put them on the top of those societies or we encourage them to become dissident of their culture and forth, they will be the future star of their/our society. This equation is well-known and these stars are our governments ex cathedra.

Additionally, what I laid down in the previous text, was a fact of events i.e. interventions that both these countries continue to violate international law, which unfortunately has been created for the small powers, i.e. inferior countries. Consequently, no politician today has been convicted for his/her actions, for his/her corrupt policies or incompetent planning and administration. No court has been created for their actions which violate every single right of human law and no court has been created to judge and act to protect the natural law. Being upon these tracks, some of the questions of the previous introduction -- remain unanswered. Thus, in order to understand how power works I shall use one of the basic questions of phronetic research, and that is : [1]Who gain and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?

My first tool then, is the constitution of Britain, a country with long tradition in its parliamentarian democracy and which try to transcend this tradition into other countries around the world. And for an other reason: the father of this constitution made it flexible tool due to its modification by an ordinary act of Parliament.

Pure reflections

What then is a constitution?

The word constitution according to the updated 2003 Oxford Dictionary derive from the Latin word [2]constitutio which in English has been established as constitute, and means in the first place -- to be the components or essence of…Essentially, we use this word as being some thing very familiar to us but in reality a few people knows the importance and the content of these books. So, if there are many of those -- then, what is the difference between them and what are the common components of these affidavits? Probably many or none, remains then, to demonstrate it in one or in an other way; comparatively and rationally.

Having then, concluded in part on how came the word constitution in our vocabulary -- let us introduce some of the most prominent minds of western tradition. This approach will be mainly to show the deficiencies, polarities, discrepancies, vacuums, divergences of views upon Western’s constitutions. So, according to [3]Thomas Paine, [A] constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people constituting a government, and a government without a constitution is power without right…A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government; and a government is only the creature of a constitution.

Pain’s definition is not explicit -- so far -- and does not give us a clear picture on what a constitution comprehends. May be, by saying that ‘a constitution is the act of a people’ he means, the laws that derive from the nature, tradition, human needs, established culture, values or virtues etc., from human being. But again, we don’t know what Pain means -- and he leaves us with the wonder on how a constitution reflects to the pragmatic needs of human being. The second Pain’s sentence is close to the real realm, and he is saying that a constitution ‘antecedents a government’; with that he means the already established culture or laws of nature or of a community. Additionally, may by, [4] Lord Camden in his dilemma gives us the picture that Pain does not give us -- and he quotes: …[t]he principles of the law of nature must be incorporated in the British Constitution if they were to be observed , and they actually were so incorporated (emphasis added). [5]But Ridley, in his reflection is more explicit: first by giving a definition and second by negating the constitution of Britain and finally he is quoting the characteristics of a constitution in four parts:

[B]y constitution we mean, whenever we speak with property and exactness, that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that compose the general system according to which the community hath agreed to be governed…We call this a good government, when…the whole administration of public affairs is wisely pursued, and with a strict conformity to the principles and objects of the constitution…One purpose of this article is to show that Britain is different, and different in ways that are important politically as well as in law. It is to show that Britain does not really have a constitution at all, merely a system of government, even if some parts of it are more important to our democratic order than others or are treated (perhaps: were treated until Mrs Thatcher’s time) with greater veneration. It may be embarrassing to explain that, as in the nursery tale, the Emperor has no clothes after all, that the constitutional attire his courtiers claim to see is empty words…moreover, any discussion of how we can safeguard certain democratic arrangements that we regarded as part of the British ‘constitution’ in the past (e.g. the independence of local government) or entrench others (e.g. a Bill of Rights) against an ‘elective dictatorship’ will run into the sand (emphasis added).

The characteristics of a constitution are as follows:

(1) It establishes or constitutes, the system of government. Thus it is prior to the system of government, not part of it, and its rules can not be derived from that system.

(2) It therefore involves an authority outside and above the other it establishes. This is the notion of the constituent power (‘pouvoir constituant’--because we do not think along these lines, the English translation sounds strange). In democracies that power is attributed to the people, on whose ratification the legitimacy of a constitution depends and, with it the legitimacy of governmental system.

(3) It is a form of law superior to other laws--because (i) it originates in an authority higher than the legislature which makes ordinary law and (ii) the authority of the legislature derives from it and is thus bound by it. The principle of hierarchy of law generally (but not always) leads to the possibility of judicial review of ordinary legislation.

(4) It is entrenched--(i) because its purpose is generally to limit the powers of government but also (ii) again because of its origins in a higher authority outside the system. It can thus only be changed by special procedures, generally (and certainly for major change) requiring reference back to the constituent power. And Ridley ends that ‘there are not grounds for complacency about British democracy’ (emphasis added).

Meantime, [6] Brazier emphasize in the first place upon the codification of constitution and does not give any solution on the matter but instead gives us a mirror of the constitutional puzzle. In the second [7] additional article he gives us a definition after asking Party’s Leaders, Peers and Lords of Britain.

[A]s every schoolchild is supposed to know, the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. A British has to seek the rules of the constitution in a daunting number of places -- legislation, judicial decisions, statements about constitutional conventions, the law and practice of Parliament, European Community law, and so on…The British constitution is written, but is not codified into a single official document, or limited number of such documents, setting out those legal rules which prescribe how the state is to be governed. In implementing its range of reforms the Labour Government has caused Parliament to enact an additional and substantial corpus of statute law of a constitutional character. While, therefore, the United Kingdom still lacks a codified constitution , it has been given rather more of a written constitution by the addition of sixteen Acts of Parliament which, in whole or in part add to British constitution. (emphasis added)

Brazier having asking the wise people of Britain conclude upon a definition of a constitution and that is: ‘the set of laws, rules and practices that create the basic institutions of the state, and its component and related parts, and stipulate the powers of those institutions of the relationship between the different institutions and between those institutions and the individual’. We offer the following as five basic tenets of the United Kingdom Constitution (phrases in italics indicate subjects falling within the remit of other parliamentary committees…):

· Sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament
· The Rule of Law, encompassing the rights of the individual
· Union state
· Representative Government
· Membership of the Commonwealth, the European Union, and other international organisation. (italics in the original)

Let us pose some questions at this point: from the time when -- can a written document preserve my own rights? Doesn’t look this procedure of rights like a close book and hermeneutic? And if until now we have a written constitution what is its functionality?--therefore, has this constitution solve our problems or have laws strengthen our society in the best modus desideratum? At the first place, it looks that we cannot expect too much from the document mentioned and we have unavoidably to proceed in an other way. As will be explained in the coming discussion there are according to Aristotle at least tow major laws: [8] ‘[a]s in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars…for the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law. Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion’.


At this point I would like to add the dialogue of Plato (which will stand before us perhaps as a locus classicus on defining the perceptions of the phenomenology of mind regarding ethos, ethics, Eros with values etc,. ) with his pupil, regarding the essence, elements or contrasts with the today’s views of laws or constitutions of western philosophy. We will trip in the mind of the first rational individual of western tradition regarding laws, justice and constitutions and we will understand in this way the deviation or disquisition of the today’s constitution -- which is looking peace and virtue completely in a different path, wrong place and vectors of social sciences. So, let us reinvigorate our minds for a while…

[9] Cle. Let us proceed, if you please.
Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you consider whether they satisfy you?

Cle. Let us hear.
Ath. According to my view, any one who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Cle. Very true; and we entirely agree with you.
Ath. And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

Cle. You are quite right.
Ath. Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Cle. Proceed.
Ath. Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?
Cle. We do.
Ath. And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

Cle. Exactly.
Ath. Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

Cle. I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.
Meg. I am in the like case.
Ath. Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose-which of the two we cannot certainly know? But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression "superior or inferior to a man's self" will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Cle. Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.

Ath. Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.

Cle. Proceed.
Ath. Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink-what will be the effect on him?

Cle. Having what in view do you ask that question?
Ath. Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking is this-Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?

Cle. Very greatly.
Ath. And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?

Cle. Yes, they entirely desert him.
Ath. Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a young child?

Cle. He does.
Ath. Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?
Cle. The least.
Ath. And will he not be in a most wretched plight?
Cle. Most wretched.
Ath. Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?

Cle. Well said, Stranger.
Ath. Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?

Cle. I suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now saying that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.

Ath. True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both declared that you are anxious to hear me.

Cle. To sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation.

Ath. Are you speaking of the soul?
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

Cle. Yes, all that is well known.
Ath. Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Cle. Very good.
Ath. And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?

Cle. To be sure.
Ath. If such convivial ties should turn out to have any advantage equal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

Cle. True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

Ath. That is just what we must endeavour to show. And let me ask you a question:-Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?

Cle. What are they?
Ath. There is the fear of expected evil.
Cle. Yes.
Ath. And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

Cle. Very true.
Ath. And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

Cle. True.
Ath. Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory-confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends.

Cle. There are.
Ath. Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why we should be either has now been determined.

Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.

Cle. Clearly.
Ath. And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not introduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms against them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character-since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been-and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly temperate?

Cle. A most unlikely supposition.
Ath. Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at every draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything happening or about to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the draught.

Cle. But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among men?

Ath. No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, "O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or for any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?"

Cle. "I should," will be the answer of every one.
Ath. "And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?"

Cle. In that proposition every one may safely agree.
Ath. "And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?"

Cle. He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.
Ath. This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than with any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible change effected by the draught-his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

Cle. Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control.

Ath. Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:-"Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?

Cle. I suppose that he will say, Yes-meaning that wine is such a potion.

Ath. Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.

Cle. I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.

Meg. Certainly.
Ath. Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear-

Cle. Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not mistaken.

Ath. Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.

Cle. That is probably the case.
Ath. There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.

Cle. True.
Ath. Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?-when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk:-Would you rather test a man of a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, periling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might mention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.

Cle. That is certainly true.
Ath. And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.

Cle. Exactly so.


Unsurprisingly, both Plato and Aristotle try to transcend the technical point of their discussion: for Plato is the education which gives to the individual the endowment of future challenges which can be done by cultivating the greatest courage and the greatest fear which are the characteristics of reverence. For Aristotle, enactments are universal whereas actions are concerned with particulars. So far, the labyrinth of our discussion seems to be pure reflection and now we will transcend this point: we should operate out of the ratiocination or raisonnement of the above discussion; in stead, into deep rationality.

Deep rationality

As an infant comes to life and sees the surrounding environment and by this procedure try to touch and senses every thing that is in his subjection; and gives to everything meaning and live -- in the same way until we decease we do in all our lives. For this procedure in time -- we create in our minds the picture of our life. This picture might be of different colours, circumstances, predeterminations, behaviour, interweaved conjunctures and in this way we learn the rules of our symbiotic life with the members of our family, community, society and we evolve our virtues in natural laws. This natural creature acknowledge and obey only the natural laws that learns and apprehends gradually the knowledge of nature and therein comes to one’s senses by picturing every single moment in his life; for weighing hereafter the possibilities that these pictures might be useful in his life and which we might call these procedure ratiocination which gives to us the first rapture with the other creatures of the mother earth. After that, man uses his intuition -- hereafter he can be the master of his particular interests in his life. Therefore, there are natural laws that one can confer only when man grows up in a natural way and not in an artificial way. This natural life can be achieved only when man is governed by natural laws and not by written laws: less written laws more successful is a society more written laws more unsuccessful is a society or saying it in a paradigmatic jargon -- it is a real dictatorship. For one reason: if supposedly a written law can be applied in one state or superstate, for example, in America -- then this law can be applied universally. But this universal law is technical law and is not natural law therefore conflicts with the particular and can not survive or incentives indefinitely social tensions. Nature acknowledge natural laws and not at all artificial laws which might be called written, unwritten or canon laws. For while the medieval period -- natural law was the spring of the doctrine now seems to be the fundamental component whereby this heritage can brink us to the real nature. One might ask at this point: what is natural law in practice and how can we supersede the written laws? Of course, one can answer that natural law, is that law which gives to human being self-determination, self-understanding, self-prosperity, self-free mind which in practice means: (i) comprehension (ii) rationalize (iii) realisation and (iiii) the longevity of its own effort. Thus, summarizing the above: the present society has created technical laws that serve the interest or necessity of the power, i.e. government. As it is clear, from our analysis from the present constitutions lacks the first and the most preponderant rudiment of our nature that might be called eunomia, i.e. family order and has nothing to do in this text the above word with the Greek mythology. To give a picture of the above explanation seems to be necessary: for laws that derive from the mother nature which can be transmitted to the first mind functional institution of our life which is family; in which each of us take the first lessons, the first rules, the first laws and the first reverence or temperance must/should be our first category of laws and the most powerful incentives in our journey on the surface of the planet earth. These laws differ from region to region and some times from family to family -- therefore is a variable science. At this point I would like to line up what would be our constitution of our discussion:

1) Eunomia laws or phronetic science: concerning family or ethics and is variable science. Pragmatic knowledge and must have the highest priority towards action/praxis, context-dependent.

2) Technology laws: craft/art, context-dependent oriented towards production. In practice differ from individual to individual therefore, from region to region.

3) Written laws or epistemology: concerning society in the sense of universal laws which in practice might be consensus or treaties between two or more nations, cities, countries or states and no one can violate the others rights. Is invariable science, context-independent.

Simplifying the components of a constitution we can easily understand the problems that the today’s society confronts in its every day life. Confrontations will not stop until human being detects that has lost the first virtue which is eunomia-phronesis and whereby we can keep our eunomia in a natural modus, qua has adopted the second science and mostly the third science vis-a-vi with the first science. For this regretfully conclusion in the coming analysis we will transcend the present regime and we will have the possibility to discuss in more details the ways that the present regimes can be changed by virtue of fundamental decision which can be made only by the people of each particular society and never by restraints laws.

Clearly, so far, no constitution has been created by having incorporated the natural laws upon the pillar of a sate. Neither has been created from clear customs or ethics. At this point let us give an other example regarding the separation of powers that allegedly the above constitution mention: As stressed above from British established democracy, the state has a constitution, which has a principal to govern the state. By constitution, there are three powers: the legislature (parliament); the executive (the government) and the judiciary (judges). I’ll pose some simple questions on this track: if legislature is majoritarian how could one separate the two powers, i.e. legislature and executive which again is majoritarian, and by constitution are considered as separate power? Judiciary as its name imply, is an institution constituting by judges and are by constitution the mentor of the reforms that parliament has in its disposition and they discusses these reforms and finally approve towards execution. All this in practice means that, the executive is the power which will regulate or change or at least restrain the wages of the other two powers and by this action they can press or suppress their regulations on their policies. How could one, then, can advocate that the three those powers are separate from each other? In my view, there is merely one power. It is merely a closed circle. These institution serve the interest of their power, therefore, they intertwine in a manner that looks to be very unsuccessful to implement the notion of democracy.

Democracy as its name imply, means governing the polity by demotes, by its constitutive population. This form of pseudo-democracy rises too many questions and cannot implement this notion in its generic and organic nature. Finally, there is not in the rang of the government the implementation of logon didonai as Plato following Socrates tried to establish in the Athenian democracy, i.e. to give an account to others of what you are doing: the so called, transparency. And it would be of good idea to recall at this point as the end of this essay the saying of Sydney Low in one of his essays: [10]‘British Government is based upon a system of tacit understanding. But the understandings are not always understood’…



References:
[1] Making social science matter (2007) p.145
[2] Additionally, the word Constitution according to my view is a composition and derive from the Albanian root ‘kusht’ which means condition or premise and from the Latin suffix ‘tute’ which means ‘all’ meaning to all the people i.e. Alb. kushtetutë and Lat. Constitute. (my own translation!)
[3] Rights of Man pp.302-303
[4] Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties (1733-34) p. 88
[5] F.F Ridley, ’There is no British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s Clothes’ (1988) pp. 340-343.
[6] R. Brazier, ‘How Near is a Written Constitution?’ (2001) 52 Northern Legal Quarterly, pp 3-4
[7] Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (2001-2002) HL 11
[8] p.13 Book Two Aristotle
[9] Plato, Law 1: pp.19-28
[10] The Governance of England (1904), p. 12